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ABSTRACT ■ The Directive on European Works Councils (EWCs) introduced
areas in which management and employee representatives could contest the
development of the institution. This article reviews the outcome of this
contestation within the chemicals sector, examining the agenda, the
‘Europeanization’ of representatives, company transparency and integration
of EWCs into wider industrial relations networks. It shows that neither the
expectations of critics of the Directive nor of those who emphasized its
potential have been realized.
KEYWORDS: Chemicals Sector ■ company transparency ■ Directive on
European Works Councils ■ Europeanization ■ integration
The adoption of the EU Directive on European Works Councils (EWCs)
in September 1994, the culmination of a protracted and contested
campaign, has led to the establishment of 772 EWCs (Kerckhofs, 2005).1
The objective was to increase transparency in the affairs of multinational
companies (MNCs), to prevent their managements from circumventing
nationally defined information and consultation rights, and to promote
transnational institution-building within the sphere of industrial relations
(Hall, 1992). The Directive allowed management and labour within each
company the autonomy to define the specific details of the institution,
creating an arena of contest. This article seeks to establish the extent to
which trade union organizations2 have been able to secure objectives
within this contest.
Academic critics of the Directive argued that the measure was ‘neo-
voluntarist’ (Falkner, 1996, 1998), set standards that were unlikely to
prevent the erosion of national requirements on information and consul-
tation (Streeck, 1997) and would encourage ‘company-egoist’ tendencies
at the expense of broader collective interest (Keller, 1995; Streeck, 1998).
Moreover, the one meeting per year specified in the Directive’s fall-
back procedure was inadequate to generate an appropriate level of
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communication and networking (Ramsay, 1997) and EWC representa-
tives would be isolated from both national structures of representation
and the workers that they represent (Lorber, 1997; Wills, 2000). Within
this perspective the role of trade union organizations was to ensure more
frequent meetings, to develop training and networking facilities, and to
ensure adequate coordination within the EWC among representatives of
different nationalities and articulation between the EWC and other
industrial relations institutions. The capacity of trade unions to ‘deliver’
on these issues was questioned, with some arguing that they lack
adequate resources (Keller, 1995) and others identifying a lack of politi-
cal will within European trade unionism to shift material and political
resources to an appropriate level (Schroeder and Weinert, 2004). For
critics of the Directive trade unions were thus central to its development,
but were unlikely to be sufficiently robust to overcome its shortcom-
ings.
Those that saw more potential in the Directive highlighted the trans-
national character of EWCs, employer funding of such institutions and
the character of EWCs as component parts of a nascent European
‘system’ of industrial relations (Dølvik, 1997; Marginson and Sisson,
2004; Schulten, 1996). To realize this potential, however, networking
between EWC representatives would need to create a new dynamic of
transnational employee representation through which wide-ranging soli-
daristic strategies might develop that embrace political protest and new
forms of regulation, as well as information and consultation (Weston and
Martínez Lucio, 1998; Whittall, 2000). Training to overcome the diffi-
culties arising from the different languages and industrial relations back-
grounds of the EWC representatives was a prerequisite to the
development of these networks. In addition, support from trade union
organizations to generate and maintain reporting procedures was necess-
ary to develop links between EWCs and other industrial relations insti-
tutions and practices.
The central role assigned to trade union organizations within these two
academic positions raises the issue of labour’s response to the Directive.
In general terms, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) had
supported the Directive – in the face of intense employer opposition —
but was disappointed that it excluded co-determination rights, did not
define a role for trade unions, and included weak minimum standards.3
Furthermore, the ETUC recognized that the revision of the Directive
envisaged after September 1999 presented a future opportunity to address
such shortcomings.
Once the Directive had been adopted, practical responsibility for
implementation shifted to unions within member states and to the
European Industry Federations (EIFs), many of which established a ‘task
force’ or equivalent to coordinate the establishment and activities of
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EWCs. Their objectives included imposing a trade union agenda on
EWCs rather than remain within the restricted agenda identified by the
Directive; influencing the decision-making and operation of MNCs; and
developing cross-border cooperation through cohesive networks of
representatives (EFFAT, 2002; EMF, 2000; UNI Europa-Graphical,
2002). This article establishes the extent to which these objectives have
been achieved by one EIF, the European Mine, Chemical and Energy
Workers’ Federation (EMCEF).
Growth in the number of EWCs following the adoption of the Direc-
tive has revealed a range of characteristics that impinge on their develop-
ment. In particular, EWCs were viewed as developing through stages as
representatives seek to improve the performance of the institution
(Lecher et al., 1999; Marginson et al., 1998), although it was acknowl-
edged that many EWCs remain in rudimentary forms (Cressey, 1998;
Lamers, 1998). The content of EWC agreements was influenced by a
range of parameters including the country of origin of the company, the
sector in which it operates, the extent of internationalization of its
production and workforce, and the influence of trade union organiz-
ations (Carley and Marginson, 2000; Gilman and Marginson, 2002;
Marginson et al., 1998). Similarly, the quality and breadth of information
and consultation procedures was uneven as a result of the action of
similar variables that affect the content of agreements, but was also influ-
enced by the different national perceptions of EWC representatives
(Waddington, 2003). The extent of the variation in development and
practice that arises suggests that the Directive has not taken transnational
information and consultation out of competition. To the contrary, such
variation indicates that there is a continuum of information exchange and
consultation provisions that are conducted within the framework of the
Directive: labour contests the development of EWCs with employers,
many of whom have tried to develop the EWC to their own advantage
through using it as a communication channel to raise the level of accep-
tance of company policy and to ‘bind’ employee representatives to
management policies (Lamers, 1998; Lecher et al., 2002; Vitols, 2003).
This article explores the outcome of this contestation by means of an
examination of the views of EWC representatives towards the objectives
identified by EIFs for EWCs.
To examine these issues, the article comprises three sections. The first
identifies the source of the data and isolates the variables that inform the
analysis. The second presents the data in three stages, each of which
addresses an element of the debate between the critics of the Directive
and those that see potential in its operation. Finally, the conclusion
addresses some of the implications of these survey findings for trade
union activity in EWCs. The argument is that EWCs are in a process of
contested development. To date, this development is uneven, has not
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taken transnational information and consultation out of competition, and
has raised new challenges for trade union organizations at a time of
limited resources.
The Sample
The data on which this article is based are primarily drawn from a survey
of EWC representatives based in companies that are coordinated by
EMCEF. In addition, officers with responsibility for EWCs were inter-
viewed within several trade unions.
The development of EWC activities within EMCEF has had a
chequered history. Initially, organization was largely left in the hands of
one highly motivated individual. As in other EIFs, coordinators were
attached to each EWC with the brief of developing the institution within
a policy framework set by EMCEF. Usually, the coordinator was of the
same nationality as the country of origin of the company within which
the EWC was located. This approach proved successful in terms of the
growth in the number of EWCs, but over-reliance on a single individual
caused problems if this official left EMCEF. Consequently, EMCEF has
recently established an EWC Committee with responsibility for the
overall direction of EWC policy, including links with other institutions
of workers’ participation, information and consultation, and with
developments arising from the adoption of the European Company
Statute.
EMCEF is an important EIF on three counts. First, recent estimates
suggest that there are over 400 companies within its area of coverage that
fall within the scope of the Directive (Kerckhofs, 2005). Second, union
membership and density are relatively high in its sectors, enhancing the
potential for the mobilization of members. EMCEF is thus better
resourced than most other EIFs, although by reference to the facilities
available in many national trade unions it is understaffed and inade-
quately funded given the expanding European industrial relations agenda.
Third, the coverage of collective bargaining and, where applicable work-
place representation, is also relatively high. There is thus potential to link
EWC activities to bargaining and company representation.
Questionnaires were distributed to a structured sample comprising
one-in-four of the companies with which EMCEF, or one of its affiliates,
had concluded an agreement to set up an EWC. EMCEF staff drew up a
list of the addresses for the EWC representatives from each company in
the sample, based on information held by its coordinator. The knowledge
of coordinators was uneven — in part, no doubt, reflecting the import-
ance attached to EWC activities by the coordinators — with the result
that the addresses were often incomplete. The questionnaire was sent to
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EWC representatives from 39 companies by post and returned directly
to the author. Where ‘French-style’ EWCs (which include management
representatives) operated, questionnaires were sent only to the employee
representatives. A total of 793 questionnaires were distributed and 250
returned, constituting a return rate of 31.7 percent.
The questionnaire was designed by the author working in collabor-
ation with EMCEF staff members responsible for EWC coordination. It
was drafted in English and translated by industrial relations specialists
into a further 12 languages. Extensive and detailed discussions then took
place between the author and native speakers of these languages to ensure
that the translations maintained the intended consistency of meaning. A
questionnaire comprising the same questions was thus compiled in 13
languages. Each respondent received the questionnaire in his/her first
language.
As the overwhelming majority of respondents were men (216 or 86.4
percent), gender is not pursued as a central variable in the analyses that
follow. The age of the respondents ranged from 26 to 62 with a median
of 50 years. The sample was drawn exclusively from EWCs within the
domain of EMCEF, so sector is also excluded as a variable.4 It should be
noted, however, that companies within the sample included those with
interests in the chemicals, glass, oil/petrol and pottery/porcelain indus-
tries. The sector covered by EMCEF is thus far from uniform. Among
the 250 respondents, only 16 (6.4 percent) were not trade union members.
Four variables underpin the following analyses.
The first variable differentiates ordinary EWC members from office
holders. A total of 145 (58.0 percent) respondents held no office within
their EWC. The other 105 (42.0 percent) of the respondents were defined
as office-holders: 37 chaired the employees’ side, 70 served on the select
committee and 25 held some other office in 32 of the 39 companies in the
sample. Six (5.7 percent) of the office holders were not members of a trade
union. On average, EWC members had attended between three and four
meetings of the full EWC, whereas office holders had attended between
five and six such meetings.
A second variable concerns the country of origin of the company. Two
categories are identified. Anglo-Saxon-owned companies originate in
either the UK or the USA; seven companies are covered by this category,
from which questionnaires were returned by 43 EWC representatives.
Next there were 31 continental European-owned companies, with a total
of 206 respondents. A response from the single Japanese-owned
company within the sample was disregarded in the identification of this
variable.
A third variable identifies the country of origin of the EWC represen-
tatives. Five categories were isolated, each of which comprised a group
of countries with similar industrial relations traditions and practices.
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• The Nordic respondents (N = 40) come from Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden. All four countries have high union density,
comprehensive bargaining coverage and the articulation of company
bargaining with that at higher levels. Workplace employee representa-
tion is union-based, within frameworks determined by national agree-
ment. Nordic respondents served on 14 of the 39 EWCs in the sample.
• The Southern European respondents (N = 47) come from Greece,
Italy, Portugal and Spain, which in most cases have low union density
but medium–high bargaining coverage. Recent amendments to indus-
trial relations regimes have strengthened workplace information,
consultation and bargaining, but these arrangements are sparse
compared to those in the Nordic countries. These respondents were
found in 26 of the 39 EWCs in the sample.
• The Anglo–Irish respondents (N = 22) are from Ireland and the UK
where there are large areas of non-unionism and bargaining is
predominantly at company level. There is no wide-ranging tradition
of information and consultation in these countries, and where such
arrangements exist, they are voluntary and uneven in practice. These
respondents served as representatives on 16 EWCs.
• The Franco–Belgian respondents (N = 61) come from countries with
competing union confederations; high bargaining coverage, often
achieved through a variety of extension mechanisms, and more sophis-
ticated centralized bargaining arrangements than at company level.
Both France and Belgium have statutory systems of workplace infor-
mation and consultation. These respondents were found in 27 of the
39 companies in the sample.
• The Germanic–Dutch respondents (N = 75) come from Austria,
Germany and the Netherlands, countries where information and
consultation arrangements are widespread and closely defined by
legislation. Germanic–Dutch respondents served on the EWCs of 26
of the 39 companies in the sample.
In assembling this third variable, three respondents from Malta and two
from the Czech Republic were discounted.
A fourth variable combines the country of origin of the company with
that of the EWC representatives and comprises two categories. The first
category is ‘home country representatives’, which includes all EWC
representatives based in a company from the same country of origin as
themselves. The category comprises 62 respondents. EWC representa-
tives from eight countries constituted this category, including at least one
country from each of the national groups defined above. The second
category is ‘foreign representatives’, which includes EWC representatives
employed in a company with a country of origin that differs from their
own. There are 188 respondents in this category, drawn from 17 differ-
ent countries. All 16 of the non-members were in this category.
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The Areas of Contestation
This section presents the survey results in three stages. The first assesses
the development of the agenda of the full EWC and examines how effec-
tive the representatives rate the performance of their EWC. The second
analyses the extent to which the perspectives of the EWC representatives
are ‘European’. The third investigates whether EWCs have made
company practice more transparent and views on the integration of
EWCs with other industrial relations practices. From the outset, it should
be noted that no fewer than 179 (71.6 percent) of EWC representatives
reported that only one meeting of the complete EWC was held per year
and that all the unionized EWC representatives held two or more posts
within their national industrial relations system. The representatives thus
were experienced individuals, but met only infrequently as an EWC.
The Agenda of the Full EWC
The Directive specifies a range of issues relating to company perform-
ance and plans on which the EWC might be informed and consultation
may take place.5 The overwhelming majority of EWC agreements adopt
this range of issues as ‘standing order’ items (Marginson et al., 1998),
which should appear on the agenda of each meeting of the EWC. These
standing order items are specified in the upper segment of Table 1. The
lower segment of Table 1 includes a range of issues drawn from the
recent bargaining agenda pursued by many European trade unions or
which have been the subject of a European Directive. Following
Waddington (2003), ‘useful’ information was defined in the question-
naire as appearing in an appropriate form, usually in writing, and at an
appropriate time, that is, to allow assessment of the information and the
production of a considered response. Table 1 thus allows assessment of
whether managements are meeting their obligations defined by the
Directive and whether employee representatives have been able to
extend the agenda of the EWC to embrace issues pertinent to their
current policy objectives.
It is apparent that managements do not meet their obligations arising
from the Directive. Although the presentation of information is wide-
spread, there is not a single issue in the upper segment of Table 1 on which
more than 40 percent of EWC representatives report ‘useful information
and consultation’. Furthermore, in a significant number of cases standing
order items did not even appear on the agenda. For example, more than
30 percent of EWC representatives report that ‘changes to working
methods’, ‘new technology policy’, ‘reorganization of production lines’,
‘employment forecasts’ and ‘research and development policy’ had not
been raised at their EWC.
Waddington: European Works Councils in the Chemicals Sector
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Two interpretations, not mutually exclusive, can be applied in this
context: either managements are resisting the release of information or
employee representatives are failing to ensure the full agenda. Respondents
were asked to specify whether management, employee representatives or
both raised an item for inclusion on the agenda of the EWC. With the excep-
tion of two items, management was much more likely to have raised the
items concerned with company performance and plans. The exceptions
were ‘changes to working methods’ and ‘closures or cutbacks’, both of
which were more likely to have appeared on the agenda due to an initiative
taken by employee representatives. There is thus evidence to show that
managements have resisted the release of information. In some circum-
stances this resistance has been overcome by the employee representatives.
In previous research, the agenda of EWCs at Anglo-Saxon-owned
companies was shown to be narrower and of lower quality (Waddington,
2003), but this was not the case here. It is noteworthy, however, that items
from the standing order agenda were much more likely to have been
raised as a result of an initiative taken by the employees’ side in Anglo-
Saxon companies than in continental European ones. In other words, the
range of standing order items raised on the agenda does not differ
markedly between the two categories of company covered by EMCEF
because the greater reluctance to raise such items by managers at Anglo-
Saxon-owned companies is overcome by the actions of the employees’
side. This finding thus lends weight to the argument that the Directive
might be used to change managerial behaviour.
The results from the lower segment of Table 1 are less ambiguous. On
the range of issues drawn from the recent trade union policy agenda,
EWC representatives have largely failed to extend the focus of the EWC
and secure information and consultation of the appropriate quality. From
the perspective of developing relations between EWCs and trade unions,
and given the concern expressed by the ETUC that the Directive
excluded a formal role for trade unions, the failure of the issue of ‘trade
union rights’ to appear on the agenda of the EWCs of half of the repre-
sentatives must be a disappointment.
In the light of the limitations of their agenda, it is not surprising that
EWCs are not considered very effective institutions of information
disclosure and consultation. Table 2 presents an index measure of efficacy
disaggregated by the variables identified in the preceding section.
Since the average index score for enabling EWC representatives to
understand how their company functions was 4.0, EWCs are effective in
increasing the transparency of the company. Representatives rank the
other indicators of efficacy more modestly. Reference to the ‘all’ column
of Table 2, for example, shows that an index score of under four was
recorded for each of the basic measures of efficiency regarding infor-
mation disclosure and consultation. It is perhaps to be expected that
Waddington: European Works Councils in the Chemicals Sector
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EWCs are better as a source of information and as a check on information
provided by management than as a means of consultation. This confirms
the results presented in Table 1 and demonstrates that the shortcomings
in the breadth and quality of information disclosure and consultation
identified through case study research are wide-ranging (Lecher et al.,
2002; Marginson et al., 2004). With a score of 2.55, it is apparent that
EWCs are seen as ineffective ‘as a means to influence management
decisions’. This result lends support to the critics who argue that the
terms of the Directive are inadequate to meet the objectives set by the EC
or trade union organizations. The question thus remains; is there a
purpose in the EWC representatives gaining an understanding of how the
company functions if they are subsequently unable to influence manage-
ment decision-making?
On every indicator, office holders rate the EWC more effective than
ordinary EWC members. This suggests that the greater proximity of
office holders to the affairs of the EWC promotes a more positive view.
Apart from EWCs ‘as a means to influence management decisions’
foreign representatives rate EWCs more highly than home country repre-
sentatives. This result may reflect the greater geographical and political
distance between company headquarters and foreign representatives,
who are more likely to benefit from access to senior managers afforded
through the EWC. The lower scores recorded by home country repre-
sentatives, however, supports the view that such representatives feel they
have less to gain from involvement in EWCs. In the case of some Dutch
works council representatives this perception has led them to block the
establishment of an EWC and thus retain control of relations with
management (Blokland and Berentsen, 2003). Representatives operating
within Anglo-Saxon-owned companies also rate EWCs to be more effec-
tive than representatives based in continental European companies.
Whether this results from the weakness of information and consultation
arrangements before the establishment of the EWC or the efforts made
by representatives in Anglo-Saxon companies to ensure that standing
order items appear on the agenda remains a moot point.
There is an inverse relationship between the range and force of national
information and consultation provisions and the perception of EWC
effectiveness. Anglo–Irish representatives tend to rate the EWC as most
effective, whereas Germanic–Dutch and, in particular, Nordic represen-
tatives rate it the least effective. In the absence of any extensive domestic
information and consultation provisions, the weak provisions available
through the Directive are better than nothing for Anglo–Irish represen-
tatives.6 In contrast, for the Nordic and Germanic–Dutch representatives,
the provisions of the Directive present fewer opportunities than are
available through national legislation. That Nordic and Germanic–Dutch
EWC representatives think EWCs relatively ineffective, however, is not
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to confirm the view of the critics of the Directive that the weak provisions
will undermine national level arrangements.
How European in Outlook are EWC Representatives?
For academic critics, EWCs are ‘neither European nor works councils’
(Streeck, 1997). Streeck argued that foreign representatives would not
participate in EWCs on equal terms with home country representatives,
that EWCs were extensions of national systems rather than European
institutions, and that EWCs would do nothing to eliminate regime
competition. If this expectation is met, marked differences should be
observed among the various categories of EWC representatives. It should
also be acknowledged that the procedures used to appoint or elect EWC
representatives differ markedly. In consequence, the constituency repre-
sented by each EWC representative may be viewed differently. In other
words, there are both subjective identifications and different procedural
realities that may impinge on the perceptions of the EWC representatives.
These propositions are examined in Table 3 by reference to dimensions
based on location (Europe, country or site) and form of representation
(all employees or only trade union members). Combinations of these two
dimensions were assembled into phrases which respondents were asked
to rank and thus indicate their principal points of reference.
The ‘all’ column shows that, at best, EWC representatives adopt an
‘intergovernmental’ rather than a supranational outlook in their EWC
activities, as country is the primary point of reference for 65.6 percent of
representatives. More than 42 percent view themselves as representatives
of ‘all employees in the company throughout Europe’. The European
point of reference is thus present, but is not as prominent as the national.
In contrast, just under 20 percent view themselves as representing a single
site; that is, they display neither a national nor a European perspective.
The responses where trade union members rather than employees are the
constituency follow the same pattern. There is a more European outlook
among officeholders: 48.6 percent cite Europe as a key point of depar-
ture compared to only 37.8 percent of EWC members. Assuming office
thus seems to confer a broader perspective. For both groups, however,
the national perspective remains predominant.
As Streeck (1997) predicted, the perspectives of home country repre-
sentatives and foreign representatives differ markedly, suggesting that the
two categories participate on different, but not necessarily unequal,
terms. Most notably, foreign representatives emphasize country as a key
point of reference, whereas the home country representatives more than
any other category highlight a European perspective. The emphasis
placed on country by the foreign representatives is anticipated. In many
cases a foreign representative is the sole member from his/her country. In
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all cases foreign representatives are in the minority. The emphasis on
country is thus consistent with the scope of the constituency and the
resultant political position of many foreign representatives. Although
home country representatives emphasize country more than Europe as
their principal point of departure, the difference is less than two percent-
age points compared to a difference of more than 30 percentage points
among the foreign representatives. This suggests that home country
representatives incorporate a European perspective into their EWC prac-
tices, rather than necessarily use the institution as an extension of national
systems.
The final five columns of Table 3 illustrate a marked variation in the
points of reference used by EWC representatives from the five country-
based categories. In part, this variation arises from the characteristics of
their national industrial relations systems.
The Anglo–Irish representatives are the least likely to claim to be ‘a
representative of all employees in the company throughout Europe’.
Furthermore, they emphasize ‘trade union members’ as a point of refer-
ence, both ‘in the company from my country’ (31.8 percent) and
‘working at the same site as me in the company’ (9.1 percent) to the
relative exclusion of ‘employees’. This reflects the impact of the single
channel system of representation and multi-unionism. Like Nordic
representatives who are also embedded in a single-channel system,
Anglo–Irish representatives emphasize union members as a key point of
reference. Although ‘all employees in their country’ remains the primary
point of reference for Nordic and the Anglo–Irish representatives, it is at
the lowest level (42.5 and 54.5 percent) for the national categories of
EWC representative. Given the particularly high rates of unionization in
the chemical sector in the Nordic countries, the distinction between
‘employees’ and ‘union members’ is often hard to draw. It is also note-
worthy that Nordic representatives accentuate ‘membership of my union
in the company from my country’ (Nordics, 22.5 percent; all, 15.2
percent). No doubt this reflects the occupationally differentiated confed-
eral structure, the outcome of which is the presence of several unions
within many workplaces. Although the basis of confederal differentiation
is political or ethnic, rather than occupational, for the Southern European
and the Franco–Belgian EWC representatives, they also emphasize
‘membership of my union in the company’ as a point of reference.
‘Site’ is a key point of departure for Germanic–Dutch EWC represen-
tatives. This result is no doubt influenced by the large proportion of
home country representatives based in the countries that comprise the
Germanic–Dutch category and suggests that it is the structure of capital
in these countries rather than peculiarities in the views of EWC
representatives that underpins the dominance of the home country repre-
sentatives to which Streeck refers. Similarly, the dual system ensures that
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Germanic–Dutch representatives accentuate ‘employees’ in preference to
‘trade union members’ as a point of reference.
Southern European EWC representatives emphasize country as a point
of reference. While Europe remains as important as for most others,
‘employees working at the same site as me in the company’ is down-
played as a point of reference.
Franco–Belgian EWC representatives emphasize ‘Europe’ more than
any other national group, but not at the expense of their national origins.
Instead, they downplay ‘employees working at the same site as me in the
company’, thus indicating an influence of the very different character of
the Franco–Belgian system of workplace representation compared to that
found in the Germanic–Dutch countries.
EWC Activity in Wider Context
Beyond the content and quality of the information and consultation
agenda and the perspectives of the EWC representatives, the debate on
the likely outcome of the Directive centres on two questions. First, what
effect, if any, does the presence of an EWC have on the transparency of
the affairs of the company within which it is located? Second, can EWC
representatives integrate EWC activities with other industrial relations
practices to secure ‘added-value’ for trade union organizations? Table 4
presents the results on these two questions. The transparency issues are
presented in the upper segment and the integration issues in the lower
segment of the table.
The ‘all’ column reveals markedly higher scores on the issues associ-
ated with transparency than those concerned with integration. In particu-
lar, the scores of 3.6 or more on ‘discussions/negotiations within your
company’, ‘dealing with management at your workplace’ and ‘relations
with management’ lend considerable support to the view that the Direc-
tive has made the affairs of multinational companies more transparent.
The transparency, however, is not matched by influence; on this, all EWC
representatives are far less positive: ‘securing greater influence for
workers at work’ scores only 3.19. This confirms the commentary
attached to Table 2 and supports the view of the critics that the short-
comings of the Directive will limit the gains that might be secured
through it.
The scores on the integration of EWC activities are uneven. On ‘a
means to develop networks among employees representatives’ and
‘relations with other unions’ a score greater than 3 was recorded. These
results offer some support to those who saw potential in the Directive in
so far as networking among EWC representatives and establishing
stronger relations between trade unions are prerequisites to effective
development for EWCs. On each of the other integration activities, EWC
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involvement was seen to be more ineffective. This was particularly the
case regarding EWC engagement ‘as a means to organize union action’,
which is problematic as any transnational action is the primary means
whereby influence can be brought to bear on management and requires
the coordination of union activity. Given that these areas are weak in the
relatively well organized chemicals sector, it seems reasonable to assume
that most EWCs are unable to bring sufficient influence to bear to alter
significantly management decision-making.
In a manner consistent with findings reported above, office holders
tend to be more positive about their EWC engagement than other
members. This is the case for all the transparency issues and most of the
integration issues. Furthermore, on the EWC ‘as a means to develop
networks among employee representatives’ the average score was higher
than four, suggesting that EWC involvement is particularly beneficial for
developing networks among office holders. Consistent variation between
office holders and other members, however, indicates that differences are
emerging within the employees’ side that could weaken transnational
collaboration.
The overall pattern of higher scores for the transparency issues than
for the integration issues is replicated for both home country and foreign
representatives. Differences between them, however, are even more
consistent than those between office holders and EWC members. Foreign
representatives view EWC involvement more positively than home
country representatives on the transparency and the integration issues.
The higher scores recorded by foreign representatives on the trans-
parency issues reflect the difficulties traditionally encountered by foreign
representatives in securing information on company activities and
strategy, and indicates that EWCs have facilitated, to some degree, the
transnational flow of information. The more positive scores of foreign
representatives on the integration issues again support the view that they
are the main beneficiaries of EWC involvement.
Although the integration issues tend to receive lower scores than the
transparency issues in both Anglo-Saxon and continental European
companies, there are few consistent differences between the views of
representatives in the two categories of company. In other words, it
appears that the country of ownership has no consistent effect on either
the transparency or the integration issues. One explanation for the
absence of variation between companies of different origin in this regard
is that Anglo-Saxon, in particular US, companies are increasingly likely
to employ European managers to run their European operations
(Marginson et al., 2004). In such circumstances personnel policies may
thus mitigate the impact of country of ownership.
The final five columns of Table 4 report the results of transparency
and integration by reference to the country of origin of the EWC
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representatives. For every national group the same pattern is evident
throughout: the performance of EWCs on transparency issues tends to
be ranked higher than on integration issues. Southern European repre-
sentatives are the most positive about their EWC involvement on both
sets of issues. Nordic representatives are the most critical on the trans-
parency issues followed by the Germanic–Dutch representatives,
whereas the latter are the most critical on integration issues. In particu-
lar, Nordic representatives are the most critical of all on the capacity of
EWCs to improve ‘relations with management’, whereas Germanic–
Dutch representatives have least confidence in the capacity of EWCs ‘as
a means to develop networks’. Anglo–Irish representatives are the most
positive on this latter issue. This pattern of results is consistent with an
explanation based on the effect of the more extensive information and
consultation rights available to Nordic and Germanic–Dutch representa-
tives within their national systems compared to those available to their
counterparts elsewhere.
Conclusion: How Might Trade Unions Raise their Game?
The long-standing nature and the relatively high density of trade union
organization in the chemicals sector suggest that it is one of the segments
of the labour market in which trade unionists have strategic strengths to
deploy in contesting the development of EWCs. It seems likely that in
less well-organized sectors a wider range of difficulties will have to be
overcome if EWCs are to be developed. Even in the relatively well-organ-
ized chemicals sector, however, it is clear that leaving specific details of
the information and consultation arrangements in EWCs for manage-
ment and labour to contest has created a wide-ranging challenge for trade
union organizations and has ensured that transnational information and
consultation rights remain embroiled in inter-company competition.
In terms of the objectives identified by EIFs, this article illustrates the
extent to which EWCs are an institution in process. The increase in the
transparency of company affairs is clearly a major benefit. Furthermore,
representatives have compelled managements to release information on a
wider range of issues than was initially intended. In contrast, shortfalls in
the breadth and quality of the agenda, the restricted extent to which
activities are integrated with other industrial relations practices, and,
above all, the limited capacity to influence management decision-making,
impose significant limits on the utility of current EWC involvement from
the perspective of the employee representatives. There is no consistent
evidence to suggest that representatives have been able to impose a trade
union agenda on EWCs; rather, they have had to struggle to ensure that
the standing order agenda has been maintained.
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The results also provide three important pointers regarding management
attitudes. First, the absence of any uniformity to the agenda of EWCs indi-
cates that managers within many companies are acting to restrict the
content and quality of information and consultation. Second, despite the
view expressed by UNICE, there is no evidence to indicate movement
towards a single model of employee representation in Europe: on the
contrary, the combined effect of the terms of the Directive and employer
resistance to meeting even the standing order requirements of the agenda
have ensured wide variation in the nature and the form of transnational
employee representation in Europe. Third, managers have prevented
EWCs from impinging on their decision-making. As EWCs have also
improved the transparency of company affairs, there are acute dangers for
representatives who might find it difficult to separate themselves from
management decisions while unable to influence such decisions.
In the light of developments to date, how can trade union organiz-
ations act to secure greater influence on EWC competence? In the context
of the findings, two principal areas where improvements might be sought
are highlighted: the agenda and the integration of EWC activities with a
wider range of trade union practices.
At one level the requirements regarding the agenda are straight-
forward: namely, to ensure that the standing order agenda is attained and
that the quality of information and consultation is satisfactory. To these
ends, the ETUC, supported by the EIFs, proposed a range of revisions
to the Directive, with particular attention directed towards improving the
quality and timeliness of information and consultation (ETUC, 2000).
Although these proposals were overwhelmingly supported by EWC
representatives from six countries (Waddington, 2003), the reluctance of
the Commission to revise the Directive to meet these basic requirements
effectively puts the onus on company-by-company negotiations to revise
EWC agreements in line with the ETUC proposals. As many agreements
are being renegotiated or include provision for renegotiation some
progress to this effect is already underway. Furthermore, several EIFs and
national trade unions have published ‘best practice’ standards that incor-
porate requirements on quality and timeliness, and now refuse to sign
EWC agreements that fail to meet these standards.
Of course, it is a basic requirement that information exchange and
consultation of sufficient quality inform practice. The intention of trade
unionists, however, is to develop this practice to embrace a broader
agenda. Recent developments that link EWCs with the corporate social
responsibility agenda illustrate developments in this regard. In the chem-
icals sector, agreements on corporate social responsibility have been
concluded at Rhodia, Statoil, Freudenberg and Endesa (Hammer, 2005).
Such agreements commit the company to observing ILO conventions
throughout its global operations, including a right to trade union
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membership among all employees. A similar agreement at Daimler–
Chrysler has recently been used to compel a Turkish company in the
supply chain of the multinational to recognize trade unions (Metz, 2005).
Agreements on corporate social responsibility may thus be used to extend
trade union organization and bolster resources to the employees’ side.
A range of reforms have recently been introduced by some trade union
organizations to improve the support of EWC representatives and to
integrate their work with other trade union activities. To this end some
national trade unions convene courses for EWC representatives from
several countries, while initial generic approaches to training have been
largely jettisoned in favour of bespoke courses that address issues of
particular concern to representatives from individual companies.
Procedures for reporting back the outcome of EWC deliberations and for
instituting communication systems have also been developed in recog-
nition of the specific problems faced by EWC representatives in these
fields. However, support for EWCs is often provided by officers who
have no role in setting the bargaining agenda for their company: for
example, by an individual based in the International Department of the
union or in a ‘stand-alone’ role dedicated to EWCs. While such indi-
viduals may be best placed to represent the union in discussions with
European institutions or to set and monitor standards for EWC agree-
ments, they are distant from the range of bargaining activities conducted
within companies. To eliminate this distance several trade unions are now
transferring day-to-day responsibilities for EWCs to officers with a
direct role in bargaining and involving EWC representatives in formulat-
ing the bargaining agenda. Such a shift also opens opportunities to link
the nascent bargaining agenda of EWCs with that pursued within
companies through national bargaining arrangements.
To conclude: although the situation from the perspectives of many
EWC representatives is far from satisfactory, the presence of the insti-
tution provides a platform on which trade union influence can be
extended. To establish more wide-ranging influence they will have to
contest the development of EWCs with management. Current trade
union approaches to the support of EWC representatives and to the inte-
gration of their activities within a broader trade union agenda require
improvement if the outcome of this contestation is to prove more favour-
able.
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NOTES
1 The same source indicates that 2204 companies come within the scope of the
Directive, including those based in the 10 new Member States of the EU.
The current rate of coverage is thus 35 percent. It should be noted that the
current number of EWCs is 784 because several companies operate more
than one EWC.
2 The term ‘trade union organizations’ is used here to refer to the European
Trade Union Confederation, European Industry Federations, national union
confederations and trade unions within member states.
3 In particular, it argued for more than one meeting of the full EWC per year,
more detail on the timing of the provision of information and the conduct of
consultation, and lower company size thresholds for inclusion within the
scope of the Directive.
4 Waddington (2006) examines the development of EWCs in the metal and
engineering sectors.
5 These include: ‘the structure, economic and financial situation, the probable
development of the business and of production and sales, the situation and
probable trend of employment, investments and substantial changes
concerning organization, introduction of new working methods or
production process, transfers of production, mergers, cut-backs or closures
of undertaking, establishments or important parts thereof and collective
redundancies’.
6 The position in Ireland and the UK may change with the implementation of
the Information and Consultation Directive.
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